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Abstract
In this paper we examine factors that influence support for terrorism, using the PEW 2010 
Global Attitudes Survey. We assess aggregate results, drawing on items fielded to all Muslim 
respondents to identify broad factors that appear to indicate likely support for suicide terrorism. 
Results from a logistic regression model suggest that being female, having an educational 
degree, a commitment to certain Muslim beliefs and values, and being a member of the Shi’a 
minority might be probable indicators of support for terrorism. Some of the results were also 
counterintuitive. We consider the implications of our findings for understanding passive and 
active support for terrorism among Muslim communities.
Introduction
The question of Muslim support for Islamist-inspired terrorism has generated a public and 
political debate as to whether support for terrorism is rooted in Muslim religiosity and faith, 
particularly through the concept of jihad, which is sometimes interpreted as providing 
justification for violence against civilians.[1] Scholars have challenged such views, arguing that 
it distorts Islamic beliefs and principles.[2] In addition, empirical research has shed light on the 
complexity of attitudinal support for terrorism among Muslims, with some studies indicating it is 
shaped by a range of factors, least of which necessarily relate to religiosity or Islamic faith[3].
Given the saliency of the issue, it is important that debates and policies on terrorism are 
anchored in an informed understanding about why some Muslims may have sympathy and 
support for terrorism. This is not an insignificant issue because, as Sageman argues, the fight 
against terrorists groups such Al-Qaeda, is largely about winning over the “hearts and minds” of 
Muslim communities.[4] Doing so requires an understanding of the content of Muslim beliefs as 
well as factors that shape such attitudes.[5] Also examining support for terrorism can provide 
insights into whether terrorism is tolerated by co-religious groups. Such implicit support might 
be able to provide a “cloak of legitimacy” for terrorists and their causes, providing fertile ground 
for radicalisation, allowing terrorists to conduct operations more frequently and with greater 
ease.
Research on support for terrorism within Muslim-dominated countries has mainly relied on 
public polling survey data.[6] There are methodological limitations with such public polling 
data[7]; one needs to be careful with concluding that results translate into an accurate measure of 
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active support for terrorism itself. Despite this caveat, such polling data can provide a useful 
proxy for measuring passive support for Islamist-inspired terrorism (i.e. ideological or 
attitudinal), given the challenges of conducting large-scale survey work on terrorism.[8]
In this article we examine support for terrorism among Muslims using data from the 2010 
PEW Global Attitudes survey (the most recent available PEW data at the time of writing). Our 
aim is to contribute to the growing understanding about what influences Muslim support for 
terrorism and examine if there are any significant commonalities. It has been argued that the 
content of people’s beliefs about salient issues can be quite uniform, with this being the case for 
groups of particular religious orientations.[9] The PEW global attitudes survey consists of a 
twenty-two-nation survey conducted in April and May 2010.[10] The survey specifically includes 
countries that are predominantly Muslim (e.g. Indonesia and Pakistan), or countries with large 
Muslim minorities. The PEW survey collects data on socio-economic indicators, but also asks 
questions on a range of social, political and religious issues, including whether Muslim 
respondents judge suicide terrorism as justifiable (used as the dependent variable measure of 
support for terrorism in this study). Not all survey items are fielded to all respondents; there is 
some variation in the types of questions asked across countries e.g. relating to attitudes towards 
national political issues. Previous published research on support for terrorism among Muslims 
has relied on earlier PEW datasets than the one drawn on in this article. Such research has mainly  
examined variations between Muslim countries when it comes to, for example, the link between 
socio-economic conditions and support for terrorism.[11] In this article we look at overall 
aggregate results, and draw on particular items that were asked of all Muslim respondents. This 
will ensure consistency across the sample and increase our overall sample size. We do recognise 
that such an analysis can obscure variations between groups of respondents, but our aim is to 
identify general consistencies across Muslim respondents. In the next section we outline the 
method underpinning this study and describe our different variables, providing a justification for 
their selection and relevance to judgments about terrorism. Results from a logistic regression 
model are then presented and discussed. We then discuss the implications of our results and 
conclude by contemplating what our results mean for understanding passive and active support 
for terrorism.
Current Study and Survey Items
Data
As stated, this article employs data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2010. Although this 
dataset represents a very general survey of respondents in 22 countries across the globe 
(n=24,790), this analysis draws specifically on the data from 7 countries that are classified in the 
Pew dataset as Muslim dominated, namely: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Turkey; together they comprised 8,003 respondents. More specifically, the analysis 
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uses the data of respondents who are Muslim in these Muslim countries. The final dataset used 
for the analyses comprised of 6,998 respondents.
Dependent Variable:
All Muslims in Muslim countries were asked the following question: Some people think that 
suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to 
defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of 
violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to 
defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified? Responses to this question 
comprise the outcome variable in this analyses. Responses ranged from one through to four (1 = 
“Often Justified,” 2 = “Sometimes Justified,” 3 = “Rarely Justified,” and 4 = “Never Justified.”). 
For purposes of descriptive statistics, this variable was recoded such that higher values indicate 
higher levels of support for this tactic. Thus, upon recoding, this variable took the values of: 4 = 
“Often Justified,” 3 = “Sometimes Justified,” 2 = “Rarely Justified,” and 1 = “Never Justified.” 
For purposes of the regression analysis only, this measure was recoded as dichotomous variable 
(0 = Never Justified and 1 = Ever Justified) and analysed by using logistic regression.
Independent Variables:
Studies on support for terrorism have generally categorised variables that impact on levels of 
support under five broad headings: social and demographic factors; economic and political 
factors; Islamic commitment and faith; institutional and political trust and foreign policy 
positions.[12] While we were limited in the number of variables we could include in our model, 
given the fact that we only selected items asked across all Muslim respondents, we have aimed to 
include items that in one way or another tap into factors across these five topic areas.
Important demographic variables such as “sex” (male = 0, female = 1), “age” (continuous 18–
85) and “marital status” (all other = 0, married = 1) were included in the model due to the fact 
that the conventional wisdom is that young, unmarried males are the most likely candidates for 
participating in a terrorist campaign.[13] However, it should be noted that 71 percent of the 
respondents were married. While males and females were equally represented (50% for both), 69 
percent of the male respondents were married and so were 73 percent of the women. The model 
also included employment status (unemployed = 0, employed = 1), children under 18 years living 
at home (no children =1, 1-3 children =2, 4 or more children = 3), and education (incomplete 
secondary or less =1, complete secondary = 2, complete tertiary =3).
Six indices were created and included in our model as independent variables. The items used 
in each index were determined by factor analyses, with each index comprising a 1-factor 
solution. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for these independent variables are presented in 
Table 1.
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The Religious Extremism index is comprised of two items tapping how concerned respondents 
were with, firstly the rise of extremism in their own country and, secondly the rise of extremism 
in the world. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = concerned and 1 = not 
concerned). The index religious extremism is comprised of the mean score for these two items. 
The aim here is to understand how certain political and ideological positions influence support 
for terrorism, the assumption being that Muslims concerned about religious extremism are more 
likely to reject terrorism than those that do not.
The Conservative Muslim index is comprised of four items, tapping whether respondents are 
in favour or oppose making each of the following items law in their country: (1) segregation of 
men and women in the workplace; (2) punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for 
crimes like theft and robbery; (3) stoning people who commit adultery; and (4) death penalty for 
people who leave the Muslim religion. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 
= oppose and 1 = favour). The index Conservative Muslim is comprised of the mean score for 
these four items. The reason for including this item is that arguments have been presented that 
fundamentalist Muslim values and beliefs influence support for terrorism, promoted in particular 
through the “clash of civilisations” thesis and arguments that literal and narrow interpretations of 
Islamic doctrine are antithetical to Western secular values.[14] Bernard argues that Muslim 
fundamentalists reject democratic values and desire an authoritarian state that implements 
Islamic law and morality. [15] This allegedly leads to sympathy for violent acts that aim to 
defend Islam, such as suicide terrorism.[16]
The empirical reality of such positions needs to be tested so as to ensure there is an informed 
debate about what might generate support for terrorism. Similar propositions led us to select the 
next two variables - Women shouldn’t have rights and Religious observance variables. The 
Women shouldn’t have rights index is comprised of two items, tapping agreement or 
disagreement to two statements regarding women’s rights (1) women should have the right to 
decide whether or not they wish to wear a veil; and (2) women should be able to work outside the 
home. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = agree and 1 = disagree). This 
index is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The Religious Observance index is 
comprised of two items, observance to pray and fasting, with each item measured on a different 
frequency scale. How frequently a respondent prayed was measured on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from hardly ever to five times a day. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 
1-4 = 0) and religious observance (codes 5-7 = 1). How frequently a respondent fasted was 
measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to always during Ramadan and other 
religious holidays. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-2 = 0) and 
religious observance (codes 3-4 = 1). The index religious observance is comprised of the mean 
score for these two items.
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Dissatisfaction with US foreign policy and its perceived injustices towards Muslims is also 
argued as potentially being relevant to why some Muslims may support terrorism. [17] There 
have been efforts to shift such perceptions by the current US administration [18] and in this 
regard we included an Obama International Policy index, comprised of six items tapping the 
approval or disapproval of the way President Barack Obama deals with the following six issues: 
(1) international policies; (2) the world economic crisis; (3) the situation in Afghanistan; (4) Iran; 
(5) the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; (6) the situation in Iraq. The responses were 
recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = disapprove and 1 = approve). The index Obama 
International Policy is comprised of the mean score for these six items.
The link between poverty and terrorism is a popular explanation for the root causes of 
terrorism. However, it has been discredited by a number of studies. [19] Other explanations point 
to assessments of societal or national well-being as more relevant to influencing support for 
terrorism, via judgments about one’s societal, economic and political circumstances.[20] Hence it  
is more about relative, than absolute deprivation that matters when influencing approval for 
terrorist attacks. While not a perfect measure of this issue, we included an Economic and 
Political Situation in one’s own Country index, comprised of three items. The items were recoded 
as dichotomous variables (0 = good and 1 = bad) and tap (1) how respondents feel things are 
going in their country; (2) the current economic situation in their country; (3) how good a job 
their government is doing in dealing with the economy. The index Economic and Political 
Situation in one’s own Country is comprised of the mean score for these three items.
Six other dummy variables were used in the model: member of Sunni or Shi’a Muslim group; 
importance of religion; the role of political Islam; whether there is a struggle between modernists 
and fundamentalists; tension between Sunnis and Shia’s seen as a problem; and US military 
threat to your country.
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Table 1: Internal Reliability Coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha = CA) for variables
Name of variable n No. of items in a 
scale
CA
Religious extremism 6097 2 0.66
Conservative Muslim 6011 4 0.80
Women shouldn’t have the right 
to choose to wear a veil or work 
outside the home
6574 2 0.62
Religious observance 6586 2 0.45
Obama international policy 4113 6 0.87
Economic and political situation 
in own country
6223 3 0.76
Data Analysis and Results
The dependent variable (support for terrorism) is measured dichotomously. A binary logistic 
regression (LR) model was used to explore a number of possible predictors while including a 
number of control variables. The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 2. 
Among the demographic variables explored in this model (age, gender, marital status, children in 
the household, education), only gender and educational status turned out to be significant. These 
results suggest that the likelihood of a Muslim woman supporting terrorism, compared to a 
Muslim man, was approximately one fourth (22%). Muslims with graduate or post-graduate 
qualifications were 28 percent more likely to support terrorism than those who had not completed 
secondary schooling.
Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious 
extremism, women shouldn’t have rights, religious observance, and Obama’s international policy. 
These indices are continuous, thus the odds ratio refers to a unit change, more specifically a unit 
denotes 1 for each of the six indices. Muslims who are not concerned with the rise of extremism 
in their own country and the world are 61 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims 
who are concerned. Muslims who do not support women’s rights to wear a veil or work outside 
the home are 15 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do support Muslim 
women to have such rights. Muslims who actively observe religious rituals such as praying and 
fasting are 44 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims that occasionally observe 
these religious rituals. Muslims who approve of the way President Barack Obama deals with 
various international policy issues are 53 per cent more (sic!) likely to support terrorism than 
Muslims who disapprove of the way he deals with these issues. Members of the Shi’a Muslim 
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group are 109 per cent more likely to support terrorism than members of the Sunni Muslim 
group.
Two variables had a negative relationship with terrorism support, such as: perceived struggle 
between modernists and fundamentalists and tension between Sunni’s and Shi’a’s in the Muslim 
world is not seen as a problem. Muslims who perceive there to be a struggle in their country 
between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists, are 23 per cent 
less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do not think there is a struggle between these 
factions. Muslim's who indicated that the tension between Sunni and Shi’a is not a problem, are 
48 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who indicated that the tension between 
these groups is a problem.
Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for the Support for Terrorism 
95% CI for Odds Ratio
Β SE Lower Odds Ratio Upper
Religious extremism 0.48*** (0.11) 1.31 1.61 1.98
Conservative Muslim -0.06 (0.12) 0.74 0.94 1.19
Women shouldn’t have the right to choose to  
wear a veil or work outside the home 0.14* (0.05) 1.03 1.15 1.28
Religious observance 0.37* (0.15) 1.08 1.44 1.92
Obama’s international policy 0.43** (0.15) 1.15 1.53 2.05
Economic & political situation own country 0.00 (0.10) 0.81 1.00 1.23
Muslim group - - - - -
Sunni - - - - -
Shi’a 0.74*** (0.15) 1.57 2.09 2.78
Importance of religion - - - - -
Important - - - - -
Unimportant 0.15 (0.23) 0.74 1.16 1.82
Political Islam - - - - -
Good - - - - -
Bad -0.14 (0.08) 0.73 0.87 1.02
Struggle between modernists & 
fundamentalists 
- - - - -
No struggle - - - - -
Struggle -0.40*** (0.08) 0.57 0.67 0.78
Tension between Sunnis & Shias - - - - -
Problem - - - - -
Not a problem -0.66*** (0.09) 0.43 0.52 0.62
US military threat to your country one day - - - - -
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Worried - - - - -
Not worried -0.11 (0.08) 0.76 0.89 1.05
Gender - - - - -
Male - - - - -
Female 0.20* (0.10) 1.01 1.22 1.48
Age 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 1.00 1.01
Employment status - - - - -
Unemployed - - - - -
Employed 0.18 (0.10) 0.99 1.20 1.45
Marital status - - - - -
All other - - - - -
Married -0.08 (0.11) 0.75 0.93 1.14
Children under 18 living in the household - - - - -
No children - - - - -
1-3 children 0.15 (0.12) 0.93 1.17 1.47
4 or more children 0.21 (0.14) 0.94 1.24 1.62
Education - - - - -
Incomplete secondary/high or less - - - - -
Complete secondary/high -0.05 (0.09) 0.79 0.95 1.14
Graduate/Postgraduate 0.25* (0.12) 1.01 1.28 1.62
Constant -1.02*** (0.27) 0.21 0.36 0.61
Observations 3074
Pseudo R2 0.05
Log likelihood -1960.674
chi2 (df=20) 210.09
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0. 05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Discussion and Conclusion
In summary: among the demographic variables explored in this model only gender and 
educational status turned out to be important. Four of the six indices were significant predictors 
for support of terrorism: religious extremism seen as a problem, women shouldn’t have rights to 
choose to wear a veil or work outside the home, religious observance, and Obama’s international 
policy.
The Obama international policy result was somewhat counter-intuitive, in that despite 
approving of how US President Obama was dealing with various international policy issues, 
some Muslim respondents still reported they supported terrorists’ acts. Hence, while perceptions 
may be improving among Muslims about how the US might be addressing certain political 
issues, this may not translate into attitudinal opposition against terrorism – which is a central aim 
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of US attempts to win the “hearts and minds” of people in Muslim-dominated countries.[21] This 
conundrum maybe the outcome of other factors that have not been measured here, such as the 
historical legacy of US foreign policy decisions or the perceived victimisation of Muslims by 
local and foreign governments, that maybe more difficult to shift despite the efforts of one well-
intentioned US president.
One of the more significant factors influencing support for terrorism was being a member of 
the Shi’a Muslim group as opposed to Sunni. One explanation for this is that our dependent 
variable measure of support for terrorism (justification of suicide bombing) potentially taps into 
beliefs about martyrdom, which have a strong tradition and legacy among Shi’a Muslims, and 
have been identified as promoting support for radicalisation and Islamic fundamentalism among 
Shi’ite minorities.[22] However, the validity of such results would need to be verified by 
additional data gathered from Muslim communities that having sizeable Shi’a populations, such 
as India, Bahrain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Our results indicate that neither economic and political judgments, nor low levels of formal 
education appear to influence support for terrorism, raising doubt about the link between socio-
economic conditions and the perceived legitimacy of terrorists acts.[23] Two particular results are 
worth stressing here: (i) the fact that particular values (attitudes on women’s rights – i.e. wearing 
the veil and working outside the home) and (ii) religious divisions (i.e. identifying as a Shi’a 
Muslim) did influence support for terrorism.
The implications of these results can be interpreted in a number of ways. One would be to 
conclude – as many political leaders and media commentators do – that the results show there is 
something inherently conservative and fundamentalist about Islam that generates support for 
violent jihad and antipathy towards Western secular values. It follows then that one solution lies 
in policy responses that promote a “moderate” form of Islam that encourages tolerance and a 
more liberal interpretation of the Quran. This is problematic, because it should not be up to 
governments to dictate what form of Islam Muslim people should follow – they should be free to 
decide for themselves. This does not mean that normative values derived from belief systems 
among Muslims should not be contended with or challenged when aiming to combat terrorism – 
the question is how can this be done in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities. This is 
important to consider because there is an intense debate among Muslims and Islamic scholars as 
to how elements of the Quran should be interpreted, for instance around the meaning of jihad 
[24]. Hence while there may be uniformity in the saliency of certain Islamic beliefs (e.g. jihad as 
a moral and spiritual battle) it does not mean that this will be expressed in similar ways i.e. used 
to legitimise violence.
Perhaps one solution lies in recognising the types of “sacred values” that underpin Muslim 
beliefs.[25] Sacred values are morally generated positions that produce devotion to core 
principles such as the importance of family, country, religion, honour, justice and collective 
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identity. While they can often have their basis in religion, they can also be derived from core 
secular values e.g. fairness and reciprocity.[26] What is important is that sacred values drive 
behaviour in ways that trump individual calculations of self-interest. As Atran and colleagues 
have argued and shown, the most intractable political disputes and extreme behaviours are the 
outcome of sacred values, such as those underlying the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.[27] Our 
results are potentially the manifestation of the impact of sacred values on support for terrorism, 
namely Shi’a beliefs that have traditionally celebrated martyrdom as a sacred duty and beliefs 
relating to the female Muslim duty to wear the hijab and remain within the home. Rather than 
criticise such values or rail against their manifestation, a more productive response is to 
recognise their inviolability and respect the right of Muslims to have such beliefs, because this 
can actually lead to concessions on the behalf of those that hold such values.[28] The problem is 
that this is something that Western governments and their constituencies have found difficult to 
do when it comes to addressing the problem of terrorism. Our results show that what drives 
support for terrorism is multifaceted, and that shifting the “hearts and minds” of Muslims about 
the legitimacy of terrorism must reflect this complexity in a way that does not isolate Muslim 
communities.
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